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Ever since the announcement of the summit was 
made on March 9th, US President Donald Trump 
has hardly been able to hide his eagerness and 
optimism about his upcoming encounter with the 
leader of the North Korean regime. For Trump, Kim 
Jong-un’s sudden interest in diplomatic talks on 
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the 
direct result of the US maximum pressure campaign. 
This belief, in combination with Trump’s view of 
himself as a master negotiator, has led him to think 
that the US will finally be able to “make a deal on the 
de-nuking of North Korea.” 
Meanwhile, more skeptical voices have pointed 
at Kim’s increased confidence as the regime is 
seemingly acquiring operational nuclear missiles 
that can hit the US mainland.  Also, skeptics have 
underscored the value of these nuclear missiles 
in forcing Trump to treat Kim like a world leader. 
After all, no US president agreed to meet with Kim 
before he had them. The picture becomes all the 
more complicated when one recognizes that both 
parties may well look at the denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in very different ways. For 
Washington, denuclearization should be complete, 
verifiable and irreversible. In an ideal scenario, 
North Korea would simply hand over its weapons 
and allow international inspectors to verify that 
the regime is keeping its word. For Pyeongyang, 
however, denuclearization is probably a two-way 
process. It most likely means mutual steps to get 
rid of nuclear weapons, including a US commitment 
to remove its nuclear umbrella over South Korea 
(and Japan) that it considers a direct threat to its 
own security. Clearly, many challenges lie ahead for 
the White House, and the North Korea file remains 
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far from a done deal. Nonetheless, if Trump plays 
his cards wisely, he might well turn this summit into 
a diplomatic victory and lay the groundwork for a 
much-welcomed long-term solution. 
US President Donald Trump surprised the world 
by accepting North Korean leader Kim Jong-
un’s invitation to talk, thereby setting the scene 
for potentially the first ever meeting between a 
North Korean leader and a sitting US president. 
A Trump-Kim summit, which American officials 
say will take place this coming May or June at 
a location yet to be determined, would mark 
a turning point in US-North Korea relations. 
After a year of escalating tensions and insults 
between the two leaders, the prospect of 
talks seems like a welcome development. 
Americans have looked at North Korea as 
the land of lousy options for several decades 
now, so why not try the unprecedented? Yet, 
Trump’s diplomatic gamble is not without 
risk. Previous rounds of negotiations have 
not led to a major breakthrough and have 
left both sides disappointed. Meanwhile, the 
increased sophistication of North Korea’s 
nuclear program is forcing the US to come up 
with answers. Therefore, if Trump does not play 
his cards right and the summit is perceived as 
a failure, he may well provide further excuse 
for the US to turn to military options to achieve 
what diplomacy could seemingly not.  
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As long as the US cannot credibly commit to not 
threatening the North Korean regime in the future, 
chances of the latter simply giving up its nuclear 
weapons are virtually non-existent. At this point, a 
more realistic goal for the US should be to prevent 
an open nuclear conflict. Opening up channels 
of communication are one way of reducing the 
chances of grave misperceptions leading to a 
nuclear crisis. Also, the easing of sanctions in 
exchange for the introduction of a formalization 
and verification system for Kim’s self-imposed 
nuclear and missile test freeze in combination with 
a promise to halt all enrichment-related activities 
could be something to put on the table. The latter 
would moreover serve a double purpose as it limits 
the chances of the North Korean regime selling 
nuclear technology to unfriendly third parties 
because of economic pressure. If Trump wants 
North Korea to make concessions, he will have 
to offer something in return. Alternatively, refusal 
to back down on any fronts will likely lead to a 
diplomatic impasse that would be difficult to fix. 
The need for the Trump administration to think 
in positive-sum terms in approaching the yet-to-
be-scheduled summit with Kim is closely related 
to a second issue to keep in mind: expectations 
management at home. Trump has surrounded 
himself by staff that appears far from averse to 
resorting to military action to achieve the US’ 
international objectives. The recent replacement 
of H.R McMaster with foreign policy hawk 
John Bolton as National Security Advisor is the 
latest episode in the ongoing trend of Trump’s 
systematic replacement of the so-called “adults 
in the room” that have put brakes on some of his 
more hawkish impulses. As the chance of Trump 
and Kim reaching some historic deal in their first 
encounter for the immediate denuclearization 
of the peninsula is close to zero, it is imperative 
for the White House to lower the president’s 
and the public’s expectations accordingly. In 
other words, an agreement to a timeframe for 
future negotiations on denuclearization and 
normalization of relations should, and rightly so, be 
perceived as a success. Alternatively, if the summit 
fails to produce a significant breakthrough in the 
eyes of the administration, it risks reinforcing the 
belief among some that talks are useless and only 
military options are left. 
Finally, Trump’s tendency to deal with the world 
in bilateral and transactional terms is a cause for 
concern. If the Trump administration wants to 
make sustainable progress, it will have to keep 
the bigger picture in mind. Among others, Trump’s 
plan to renege on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) – or Iran deal – are bad news for 
US credibility. The timing is particularly interesting 
in this regard. Coming May 12th, the same month 
as the expected Trump-Kim summit, is the day on 
which Trump must either sign a presidential waiver 
on sanctions on Iran or violate the multilateral 
agreement. Although he reluctantly extended the 
life of the deal last January and gave the parties 
involved a “last chance” to come up with an 
updated agreement, it remains highly uncertain 
whether he will be willing to compromise this time 
as well. Despite many differences in specifics 
between both cases, the North Korean regime will 
not fail to draw significant parallels. Furthermore, 
as a sustainable solution for the Korean peninsula 
will necessarily include China in one way or 
another, Trump should refrain from causing too 
much trouble with the latter. You simply cannot 
threaten a trade war against Beijing one day, and 
expect its acquiescence on the North Korean issue 
the next. Even if Trump himself is inclined to look 
at the world on a case by case basis (or deal by 
deal if you will), it is utterly unwise to expect others 
to do the same. 
So, a meeting between Kim and Trump: a big win 
for the latter? Although significant caution is 
warranted, the shift from warmongering rhetoric 
to diplomatic talks should be applauded. If 
the summit takes place and Trump is willing to 
compromise, manage expectations and keep the 
bigger picture in mind, he has the chance to prove 
that he is indeed the good deal maker he so often 
claims to be. 
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